Principles First (very rough draft, no quotation please)

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, (Oxford, forthcoming). I argue for a view according to which practical reason and reasoning are grounded in principles, and, in particular, that principles explain reasons. Others argue that reasons are basic to practical reasoning, and that sensitivity to reasons is basic and explains practical reasoning and rationality. I’m against that. Reasons cannot be basic in practical rationality because reasons require explanations. Those explanations are best understood in terms of practical principles, or so I think.

Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A Commentary (Oxford, forthcoming)

I have a guidebook and commentary on Kant’s 2nd Critique currently under contract with OUP.

Why Be Moral?

I will contributing an essay on this topic to the Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. D. Copp and C. Rosati, eds.

Kantian Deontology.

I am contributing a chapter on Kantian deontology to Oxford Handbook of Deontology. Rawling, J. P., (Oxford, forthcoming)